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TECHNICAL hIEhIORANDUR1 X-6.1910 
SPLASH PROGRAM EVALUATION OF SRB DESIGN 
BACKGROUND 
The Shuttle Solid Rocket Booster (SRB) is designed for recovery at sea 
and reuse. When it impacts the water, it experiences loads that are highly 
dependent upon the conditions of water impact (velocity and angle). These con- 
ditions a r e  a function of the meteorological conditions in the impact zone. 
Extremely high winds and seas have a certain probability of occurrence and 
designing for these worst-case loads potentially causes severe cost and weight 
penalties on the structure. Since the vehicle is not manned at time of impact, 
failures are purely economic. Designing for the worst-case load causes high 
program cost due to the resulting conservative design. Designing for a very 
frequent load results in a high program cost because of the large number of 
replacements required with the high attrition rate. Theoretically, the lowest 
program cost results from a lower per unit cost structure than the one designed 
for worst case and a lower attrition rate than that resulting from designing for 
no water impact loads. 
Martin Marietta, under contract NAS8-29622, studied this problem and 
developed a computer program which investigated the attrition rate and costs 
associated with a specific design. The design variables were limited to the 
parachute descent velocity and whether the nozzle extension was jettisoned. A t  
that time, the major attrition producing water impact load was slapdown. 
Martin's computer program was installed on the MSFC computer and 
modified to update the loads and allow for analysis of various designs. It has 
been used to compute attrition rates of seven SRB configurations which a r e  
described herein. 
PROGRAM DESCRIPTIQN 
The Martin program is described in Volume I1 of the report Space 
Shuttle Solid Rocket Booster Recovery Systems Definition. It is a Monte Carlo 
analysis which treats the meteorologica' :wtors  (wind, sea, etc. ) and the 
strength of each element probabilistically. Each critical load condition i s  pro- 
grammed as a table of loads input as a function of vertical velocity ( V  ),  
horizontal velocity ( V  ) , and water impact angle ( e ) .  For each Monte Carlo 
0 )  is randomly selected and the set trial, a water impact condition ( V  
of loads i s  computed by interpolation from the tables. A set of strengths is 
randomly selected and compared to the loads. If a load exceeds its companion 
strength, a failure is tabulated. The percentage of failures is the attrition rate 
for that particular structure. Motor sinkage is indicated when the slapdown 
load exceeds the strength by a factor of 1.1 (the ratio of ultimate to yield 
strength for DGAC). 
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U s i - g  the Martin analysis technique, a new computer program, SPLASH,  
was written which presents the load probabilistically. It presents the entire 
curve instead of the sum of the failures (the value of the probability) at a 
certain strength level. These results can provide general information about a 
load and they can also be used as a design tool to evaluate a number of designs 
without additional computer runs. SPLASH can present design limit loads 
(predicted actual load with no factor of safety) o r  it can divide the load by a 
strength ratio probability distribution. The resulting curves are used directly 
with the predicted ultimate strength (no factor of safety) to determine the 
failure rate. The decision of whether to use the probability of strengtli is 
based on judgement, the failure mode, the l . + t ~  9f testing used, and the degree 
of conservatism desired. 
The meteorological portion of the program has teen updated to include 
the latest results of analyses', * *3. Effects of high altitude wind gusts, low 
altitude wind gusts, wind shear, parachute release dynamics, and wave slope 
are all included. The conditioml probability is computed for each contributor 
to the water impact condition so that high gusts will not result with low wind, 
etc. The wa\e slope computed is filtered to remove the effects of all waves 
with wave lengths smaller than an effective length uuique for each type of load- 
ing. The filtering wave lengths used are vehicle length for slapdown, skirt  
diameter for cavity collapse, and nozzle diameter for nozzle and aft closure 
loads. 
1. SRB Attitude and Horizontal Velocity Probability Distributions at Water 
Impact. S&E-AERO-DD-6-74, MSFC, Mar. 4,  1974. 
2. Natural Environment Inputs for the Monte Carlo Simulation of Sea Surface 
Angle for Shuttle SRB Attrition Studies. S&E-AERO-YA-17-74, NSFC, 
Mar. 27, 1974. 
r .  Estimation of SRB Coning Motion for Attrition Studies, S&E-AERO-DD-9-74, 
MSFC, May 3, 1974. 
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The actuator loads a r e  a unique problem because of the azimuth orien- 
tation of the actuator relative to the  horizontal velocity vector. To include this 
effect, an aziniuth angle was selected rzndomly and the in-plane actuator load 
was multiplied by the sine of that angle. 
The strength probability4 is dependent upon the type of testing. The 
options for which data a r e  available a r e  no test, standard test, proof test, and 
model test. The results enclosed a r e  for the standard test where a full  size 
prototype o r  structural model is tested to the design limit load and corrections 
to the analytical model and the design are made as a result of any failures. 
RESULTS 
The strength probability distribution for s-mdard tes is  shown in Figure 
1, and the water impact conditions are shown in Figures 2 and 3. Note that 99 
percent probability values of water impact are that the angle will be less than 
12 deg and the horizontal velocity will be less than 19 m/sec ( 63 ft/sec) . 
Presented in Figures 4 through 18 are probability distributions for the 
significant water impact loads. In each case the appropriate wave slope filter- 
ing has been included and the curves with and without probability of strength a r e  
shown, Cases with and without the nozzle extension a r e  plotted separately. To  
properly use the load curves, enter the curve with a design capability on the left 
and read the attrition rate on the top scale o r  the probability of nonexceedance 
on the bottom scale. 
Generally, the probability of strength effect is to reduce the probability 
of failure for structures that have been designed for about 90 percent loads or 
less, For structures that have been designed for 3 sigma loads, the probability 
of low strength (less t h a n  10 percent, Figuie 1) will increase the failures when 
it is included and thus the curves tend to  cross  over on the right side. 
The wave slope is added directly to the angle computed using wind and 
parachute dynamics. The effect of filtering the wave slope on the resulting angle 
can be seen in Figures 3 and 1. The filter length is based on judgement and was 
4. Thomm, Jerrell a id  Hanagud, S. : Reliability-Used Econometrics of Auro- 
space Structural Systems: Design Criteria and Test Options. NASA TN D-7646, 
June 1974. 
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chosen upon the recommendation of D. Kross of MSFC. It assumes that the wave 
half length must be long enough to contribute to the dynamics and, therefore, 
must approximate the surface length over which the load acts. The effects of 
filtered wave slope on the load distribution a r e  less dramatic than on the angle 
itself. The wave slope effects on all loads except cavity collapse and actuator 
were not visible on the plots. 
A recent development in the meteorological investigations has been the 
introduction of coning effects. The parachute/SRB dynamics are three dimen- 
sional and include a nutational pendulum motion that combines rotation about 
several axes simultaneously. An additional problem is that the coning dynamics 
(rotation about the local vertical axis) have less damping associated with them 
so they increass the probability of higher angles associated with low horizontal 
velocities. Unfortunately, high angle and low velocity is a high load case for 
cavity collapse. Dynamics supplied by the Systems Dynamics Laboratory at 
MSFC5 have been progranimzd ior the nozzle and cavity collapse loads. The 
effects of wave slope and coning on the cavity collapse load can be seen in 
Figure 4. The distribution including all effects is plotted as a solid line and the 
load with wave slopr: and coning effects individually removed a re  plotted as 
dashec lines. 
The cavitj collapse loading case was a particular problem because the 
pressure distrihtion changed shape as well as peak -\ h e .  Some of the loading 
conditions presented in MSFC document S&E-ASTN-ADL ( 74-38)6 that had the 
highest peak p r a s u r e s  were not the most severe loading conditions. Because of 
this, the peak gressure ( Pz) cannot be used as an indicator of failure. Several 
possible indicitors were investigated. Lee load (the area under the pressure 
curve on the lee side) shows the best agreement with eigenvalues resulting from 
structural analyses and was  used for the attrition rates computed. 
The configurations evaluated a r e  shown in Figures 19..22. Configuration 
0 (Fig. 19)  is the proposal configuration. Configuration 1 (Fig. 20) is a design 
that includes capability for cavity collapse. Configu.ration 1-1, modified ( Fig. 
2i ) , has been optimized with the performance margin. Configuration 3 ( Fig. 22) 
is a periormance-only configuration that has the performance capability of 
5. Sce footnote 3. 
6. JJpdated SRB Cavity Collapse Water Impact Loads, Configurukion Without 
Nozzle Extension. S&E-ASTN-ADL (74-38) * MSFC, Apr. 26, 1974, 
4 
configuration 1-1 but has  no weight o r  design for water impact loading. Tables 
1 and 2 contain the results of comparing the capabilities of each configuration 
with the probability of loads. The capabilities and attrition rates are tabulated, 
In Table 2, maximum and minimum values a r e  given based upon the following 
assumptions : 
Actuator yield strength is 1112 kN ( 250 000 lb) . 
Actuator ultimate strength is 1334 kN (300 000 lb) (FTU)'. 
Nozzle ring yield at 1112 kN (250  000 lb) actuator force. 
A t  1334 kN (300 000 lb) , nozzle is released to impact other structure 
resulting in the following attrition rates: 
Maximum Minimum 
Throat and Seal FTU Rate 
Skirt 0.5 FTU iLte 
Closure F'I'U Rate 
TVC Fluid Loop FTU Rate 
0.1 FTU Rate 
0.05 FTU Rate 
0.1 FTU Rate 
0.5  FTU Rate 
COHERENT DESIGN REQU I REMENTS 
The probability distributions can be used to establish coherent design 
requirements for water impact. Coherent requirements are requirements for 
each load that result in similar failure rates. They may or may not be realistic 
to design to, depending on the codat t r i t ion  trade of each load, interrelation- 
ship between loads, and other factors. The following a r e  coherent design require- 
ments for 1 percent water impact attrition 
7, FTtT means force tension ultimate. 
5 
Factor of Safety Included 
W/O Extension With Extension 
Slapdown 20 N/cmZ (20 psi) 21 N/cm2 (30 psi) 
Submergence 17 N/cm2 (25 psi) 18 N/cm2 (26.7 psi) 
Aft Closure Pressure 570 N/cmL (827 psi) 46 N/cm2 (67 ps i )  
Cavity Collapse 1.33 x 100/15/0 1.65 x 100/'15/'0 
Dist rihution Distribution 
Nozzle Side Load 
h z z l e  Axial Force 
1735 kN (290 000 Ib) 
1557 kN (350 000 Ib) 
3000 I:N ( 6 7 5  000 Ib) 
11.4 MN ( 2  570 000 Ib) 
ATTRITION PROGRAM 
To use the results of the SPLASH program, another computer program 
was written* to compute the total number of units required. This program 
uses the mission model as supplied in the requirements documents. An 
attrition rate function that reduces with time and has an average attrition rate 
as  found from the SPLASH program is input. The output includes the number 
of units rcquired for the Shuttle program. The effects of refurbishment time, 
maximum life, and the variable launch rate are all included. 
Tables 3 and 4 contain the total attrition rates and units required for 
445 flights. The total attrition rate is 3 percent (for all nonwater impact 
causes) added to the individual structure failure rate plus the sinkage rate as 
shown in Tables 1 and 2. Where  two numbers we  given in Table 4, the larger 
number represents the inwimum failure assumption for actuator cascading 
failure effects, and the smaller number is the mfnimum assumption. These 
numbers of required mits can then be used in a cost -aalysis to compare the 
various designs and 1.0 determine the most effective design. 
8. Program was written by the Operations Development Branch of the Systems 
Analysis and Integration Caboratory at MSFC. 
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